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TORTS WITHOUT PARTICULAR NAMES.
The title of Book III, Bishop on Non-Contract Law, is
-"Wrongs with Particular Names." The first twelve chapters of Book III (Chapters XIII to XXIV) are "each devoted
to a wrong to which the law has giverr a name" (e. g., Chapter XIII, "Assault and Battery"). Then follows Chapter
XXV, on "Wrongs not Named;" wherein the author says'
" If a wrongful act whereby one injures another has received
no name, the consequence does not follovW that it will be
without redress."

And he further says:

"

....

the

fact that we can find in our books no name for a wrong is
not to any degree evidence that it is not actionable."'
For practical purposes the rights, the invasion of which
-will generally constitute a tort, may be divided into -the
"three elementary rights of civilized society-the right of
personal liberty and security, the right of reputation, and
the right of property."3 There is comparatively little diffi-culty in determining under which of these three main divisions a specific tort should be classified. And we find,
-under each large division, various subdivisions of specific
-classes of torts which are usually designated by distinct
'Sec. 486.
.*See also sec. 494.
"See Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 6th ed. p. 4: Cave J. in Allen v. Flood,
L. R. 1898, App. 1, p. 29; Sir F. Pollock, 14 Encyclopaedia, Laws of England,
.nd Ed. x39-i4o.
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names. By "Wrongs not Named," Dr. Bishop means
wrongs which do. not fall under any of these sub-divisions,
which are now generally designated by particular names.
He, in effect, asserts that the sub-classes of torts which are
now spoken of by particular names, such as "Assault,"
"Battery," etc., do not include all actionable torts.
Similar views are held by other legal authors; who use
a somewhat different phraseology. Thus Street says :4 "Particular torts, as trespasses of violence, defamation, nuisance,
and the like, can bedefined well enough, but the term 'tort'
is also used to denote wrong in general. It includes the
unclassified residuum as well as the specific definable wrongs."
So Pollock says:5 "If we enumerate the known causes of
action which have received names we cannot say that no
action will lie outside these, or we can say it only with the
warning that their borders may be extended." And in 35.
Law Quarterly Review, p. 287, in a note to the recent decision in favor of the plaintiff in Janvier vs. Sweeney, 6 the editor
says: "Such a cause of action as we have in Janvier vs.
Sweeney cannot be assigned to any of the old categories which
were supposed to exhaust the law."
To understand how the present situation, as described
by Bishop and Street, came to exist, we must look at the
history of the law of torts, and consider the manner in which
that law has gradually grown.
Originally, torts were classified according to the forms
of action under which remedies were enforced; in effect,
"a purely procedural classification." ' 7 When, at a later day,
the substantive law of torts began to receive attention, the
courts did not commence by attempting to lay down a gen-eral definition of "tort" or to define the general scope of
the term. They began to recognize the existence of various,
separate kinds of torts, which gradually came to be designated by conventional titles. In the first stage, there were4

Foundations of Legal Liability, Introduction, XXV-XXVI.
$Vol. 14, Encyclopaedia, Laws of England, 2nd ed., x35.
6L
R. (1919) 2 K. B. 316.
7
See Bohlen, Cases on Torts, Ed. of 1915, Preface, III.
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rules relating to each form of action; but no substantive
law of torts. Next, there were recognized a number of rules
of substantive law about various kinds of torts, which had
come to be known by separate names; these rules not being
entirely consistent with each other. At last, in the nineteenth century, there began attempts to frame a complete
theory of torts, and to define the scope of the general term. 8
These attempts have progressed slowly and unsatisfactorily.
The various definitions proposed have met with much criticism. 9 As might have been expected, it has been found
that the various kinds of torts which have received specific
names do not include all the wrongs which courts are accustomed to recognize as coming under the general head of
torts. Hence the admission that, besides wrongs with particular names, there are "wrongs without names "10 ("innominate grievances,") which are subjects of action, and for
which damages are recoverable.
At the present time, Holland says:" "Wrongful acts
may be, and are, classified on five different principles at
least; . . . . III. According to the means whereby the
wrong is effected, whether, for instance, by physical violence,
by words uttered, .....
.. V. According to the nature
of the right invoked, whether, for instance, it be a right to
personal freedom
The learned author prefers the fifth principle of division.12

Pollock says: 13 "The classification of actionable wrongs
is perplexing, not because it is difficult to find a scheme of
division, but because it is easier to find many, than to adhere to any one of them." Indeed, consistent adherence
3"The really scientific treatment of principles begins only with the decisions of the last fifty years . . . . ". Pollock, Introduction to first edition

of his work on Torts, in 1886; page vii.
9See Note, 3o Harvard Law Rev. 247 et seg.
10 See 26 Law Quart. Rev. 164.
uSee Jurisprudence, 8th Ed., 291-292.
1In 3o Harv. Law Rev. 241 et seq., it is suggested that the cases now
usually grouped under the head of torts can be divided into two classes: (i)
where there is fault: (2) where the court imposes absolute liability in the absence
of fault.

1327 Encycl. Brit. iith Ed., 65.
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to one system may almost be said to be the exception rather
than the rule. Holland"4 speaks of "writers who waver
between these various points of view, subdividing one portion of the whole class of wrongful acts upon one principle
and another portion upon another principle." Some socalled specific torts are named according to the nature of
the right affected or the harm done; while others are named
by the same writer according to the method or manner by
which the harm is done.' 5
As to the existence of unnamed wrongs outside of (in
addition to) wrongs which are now generally designated by
particular names; consider the large division of Rights of
Personal Immunity (personal liberty and security). That
such unnamed wrongs exist is assumed in the enumeration
of Particular or Specific torts in Jenks' Digest of English
Civil Law.6
"Section IV. Torts in respect of the Person.
Title I. Trespass to the Person.
Sub-Title A. Assault and Battery.
Sub-Title B. False Imprisonment.
Title II. Other Injuries in respect of the Person."
It is now proposed to give some instances where an
action of tort is held maintainable for conduct which does
not come under any specific class of torts designated by a
particular name.
Take, for illustration, the large division of rights of
personal immunity.1 There are two specific classes of
14Jurisprudence 8th ed. p. 291-2.
'$The common custom of enumerating "Negligence" among specific torts
is criticised as follows in Jenk's Digest of English Civil Law, Book 2, Part 3
continued, p. 545-6:
"So far from being a specific tort, negligence in itself is not a tort at all,
but is merely one of the commonest grounds of liability in specific torts. ...
The treatment of negligence as a special kind of tort is

.

.

.

. a survival

of a classification of torts based on the forms of action-a classification which
has now disappeared in favor of a division based mainly on the nature of the
interest effected; and negligence has no logical place among torts divided into
such classes as torts in respect of Property, the Person, the Reputation, and the
like." Compare 26 Law Quarterly Review, i59.
16Book
2, Part 3 Continued, pp. 431, 439, 445.
17
This might include not only personal security from harm, but also personal liberty. We are now considering only the former.
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-violation of this right which are designated by particular
names: viz., assault and battery. Upon a superficial reading of some good text-books one might suppose that all
actionable violations of the right of personal security are
comprised under these two terms; and that violations,
which do not constitute either assault or battery, are not
actionable. Yet there are decisions, made by courts of
excellent standing and unquestionably correct, where a
plaintiff is allowed to recover in an action of tort for violation of personal security by conduct which is neither assault
nor battery.
Two conspicuous examples are afforded by the decisions in Wilkinson vs. Downton,18 and in Janvierv. Sweeney,1'
compared with the usual definitions of assault and battery.
Assault may be defined as involving the following
requisites:
Physical force, unjustifiably put in motion by defendant, with intent to create, and actually creating, in
plaintiff, a reasonable apprehension of immediate unpermitted (physical) contact with himself, either of a hostile
nature or likely to result in bodily harm to himself (but not
resulting in actual contact.)
As to battery; all definitions include the element of
-contact; unpermitted contact.
We should define battery as including two classes; viz.;
(i) The intentional, unpermitted, application of force to
the person of plaintiff in a hostile or rude manner, even
though not causing bodily damage. (2) The negligent, unpermitted application of force to the person of plaintiff, if
causing bodily damage. Some jurists would not include
(2) as coming under the specific name of battery; but they
would admit that negligent, damaging contact constitutes
an actionable tort.2 0
1

1L. R. (I897), 2 Q. B. 57.
"L.
R. (I919), 2 K. B. 316.
2
°See Cooley on Torts, 2nd ed. 186. As tending to sustain our definition;
see Jenks, Digest of English Civil Law; Book 2, Part 3 Continued, section 896;
Bigelow on Torts, 7th ed. 370, 374; Bishop, Non-Contract Law, sec. 19o.
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Wilkinson vs. Downton, was an action tried by jury
before WRIGHT, J. and, after verdict, reserved for further
consideration.
Defendant, in the execution of what he seems to have
regarded as a practical joke; falsely represented to the
plaintiff that her husband had met with an accident, had
both legs broken, and had sent for plaintiff to bring him
home. The effect of the defendant's statement, which
plaintiff believed, was a violent shock to her nervous system
producing serious illness. The jury gave a verdict for
plaintiff including, besides other damages, the sum of ioo£.,
the greatest part of which was given as compensation for
the plaintiff's illness and suffering. WRIGHT J. upon further consideration, gave judgment for the entire amount of
damage assessed.
The result is now generally admitted to be correct. But
the tort was neither battery nor assault. It was not battery
for that involves contact (or impact) which did not exist
here. It was not assault; for (Ist) as to defendant's conduct; there was no force put in motion towards plaintiff,
no act other than speech, no intent to create in plaintiff a
fear of contact with herself; and (2nd) as to the effect produced on plaintiff, there was no fear on her part of contact
with her own person, no fear of any bodily harm to herself.1
WRIGHT J. does not base his decision (as to the item of
ioo£) upon the ground of fraudulent representation within
the principle established in the leading case of Pasley vs.
Freeman.22 His ratio decidendi is stated broadly as follows:
"The defendant has .
.
wilfully done an act calculated to cause physical harm to the plaintiff-that is to say,
to infringe her legal right to personal safety, and has in fact
thereby caused physical harm to her. That proposition
without more appears to me to state a good cause of action,
there being no justification alleged for the act. This willful
injurious act is in law malicious, although no malicious pur"2'Prof. Ames, in note to this case, i Ames & Smith's Cases on Torts, Ed.
says it is not a case of assault.

1910, p. 13, note 2, correctly
2 1 7 8 9 , 3 Term R 51.
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pose to cause the harm which was caused nor any motive
of spite is imputed to the defendant."
As we have seen, the facts in this case do not constitute
the specific tort which goes by the name of battery or assault.
Neither do these facts bring the case within the specific kind
of tort known as defamation, or that which is known in law
as deceit. There was no defamatory charge effecting the
reputation of either plaintiff or her husband. There wasdeceit, in the popular meaning of that term. But in law
a narrower meaning is given to it. The action for deceit is
maintained only in cases where plaintiff has been induced by
defendant's falsehood (uttered by defendant to plaintiff)to voluntarily change his position and thereby has incurred
damage2 Here the plaintiff's illness was involuntary.
The decision in Wilkinson vs. Downton was fully affirmed
by the Court of Appeal in the recent case of Janvier vs,
Sweeney,24 The defendants in the latter case were private
detectives, who wished to inspect certain letters, to which
they believed that plaintiff, a maid servant, had means of
access. In order to induce her to show the letters, they made
to her false statements and threats. One of the defendants.
told plaintiff: "I am a detective inspector from Scotland
Yard, and represent the military authorities. You are the
woman we want, as you have been corresponding with a
German spy." Plaintiff alleged that in consequence of the
statements made to her, she sustained a severe nervous
shock, became incapacitated from following her employment,
and suffered from neurasthenia, shingles, and other ailments. The jury found (inter alia);
(3)"That the statements, or some of them, were calculated
to cause physical injury to the plaintiff."
() "That the statements, or some of them, were made
maliciously, that is, with the knowledge that they were likely to
cause such injury."
(5) "That the illness from which the plaintiff suffered was
caused by the utterance of the statements or some of them."
2See
Salmond on Torts, 4th Ed. p. 494 P. 504.
24
L. R. (1919), 2 K. B. 316.
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Verdict for plaintiff, 250Z. Judgment for plaintiff. An
appeal by defendant was dismissed by the Court of Appeal.
The first paragraph in the head note is as follows:
"False words and threats calculated to cause, uttered with
the knowledge that they are likely to cause, and actually
causing physical injury to the person to whom they are
uttered, are actionable."
Here, as in Wilkinson vs. Downton, there was no ground
for alleging that there was the specific tort of either battery
or assault. As to battery; there was no contact. As to
assault; there was no force put in motion; and, even if
words alone could ever be sufficient and if the words here
could be understood as evincing an intent to procure an
arrest in future, yet they did not evince an intent to immediately arrest.
A valuable note upon this case in 35 Law Quarterly
Review, for Oct., 1919, p. 287, et seq., is as follows:
"Illness caused by sudden alarm or other painful emotion
is as capable of proof and of being estimated in damages as any
other kind of injury. Fright or 'nervous shock' may be a natural
and probable result, not only of immediate fear of bodily harm,
but of the impression conveyed by spoken words. If, therefore,
threatening words are used for the purpose of unlawful intimidation and coercion, or a false statement is wilfully made for the
purpose of giving pain, and their effect on the person to whom
they are addressed is to produce physical injury, we have the
-complete connection of an act calculated to do harm and done
without justification or excuse and temporal damage consequent
thereon, and there is no reason for denying a cause of action to the
sufferer. This doctrine is finally established, we think, by the
decision of the Court of Appeal in Janvier vs. Sweeney, (1919)
2 K. B. 316, confirming Wilkinson vs. Downton and Dulieu vs.
White, both well considered cases, as against the opinion of the
Judicial Committee in Victorian Railways Commissioners vs.
Coultas, 13 App. Cases, 222, and a minority of judgments in other
jurisdictions which have taken the same line. It will be observed
that the Court of Appeal did not think it necessary to call on
counsel for the plaintiff. That being so, the chance of the House
of Lords overruling their judgment may be neglected.
"The grain of truth in the contrary opinion is that a state
of mind such as fear or grief is not of itself a tangible cause of
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action.25 The conclusion that bodily suffering consequent upon
it is necessarily too remote to be actionable was hasty and illegitimate. Although this result is well within the lines of fairly old
authority, it increases to our mind, the difficulty of maintaining
the view quite lately held by some very learned persons, that the
Common Law does not recognize any general duty not to do harm
to ones neighbor without justification or excuse. Such a cause
of action as we have in Janvier vs. Sweeney cannot be assigned to
any of the old categories which were supposed to exhaust the law.
It has nothing to do with defamation, and it was settled long ago
(though not always) that words cannot amount to an assault.
Neither is it analogous to any form of trespass or nuisance, for no
right of property is affected. A living human body is not property. What is the action then? An innominate action on the
case? But then, what conjunction of harmful intention or recklessness with consequent damage can be formally excluded? The
supposed miscellaneous category is not really a supplement but
involves a principle covering the whole ground. After all, alterum
non laedere is a very old precept, though the Romans never worked
it out. "26
In the preceding cases, the defendant's act, causing the
fright and the consequent physical suffering, was a deliberate and willful wrong; and there was an intent to do some
harm though not so great or extensive as that which actually
resulted. How if the defendant's act, resulting in fright
and consequent physical suffering is due, not to intention,
but to negligence on the part of the defendant? Here there
is a conflict of authority. Professor Bohlen, writing in
190227 says: "Perhaps upon no question presented within
recent years has there been so much conflict in the decisions
of courts of the highest authority, as upon that of the right
to recover for negligence which causes no direct physical
impact, but where an appreciable physical injury ensues in
consequence of a fright or nervous shock produced thereby."28
Of course, there may be an action of assault where plaintiff's reasonable
fear of immediate hostile or damaging contact is intentionally created by defendant's
acts-unlawful use of force-.
2
1See 68 U. of P. Law Review, 176-179, note endorsing decision in Janvier v. Sweeney.
2741
Amer. Law Register N. S. p. 141.
2
8Prof. Bohlen sums up the then existing authorities as follows:
"A recovery has been allowed by the Court of King's Bench in England,
Dulieu v. White, L. R., i9o, 2 K B. 669; Exchequer in Ireland, Bell v. R. R.,
L. R., 26 Irish Rep. 428, I89O; and the Supreme Courts of Texas, R. R. Co. v.
Hayter, 93 Texas, 243, (19oo) Minnesota, Purcell v. R. R., 48 Minn. 134, (1892);

Ioo
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It would be foreign to the purpose of this paper to enter
now into a discussion of the above disputed point. We are
here attempting to deal only with the cases where the facts
(apart from the absence of a particular name) are admittedly
sufficient to sustain an action of tort. We are not considering cases where the existence of an actionable tort is a matter
in dispute.
As to the conflicting cases just cited in the notes, we
are concerned here only to note three points:
I. If there is held to be an actionable wrong, it is one
which cannot be classed under the specific name ofeither
assault or battery. It is not assault, because there is no
intention to cause fright or contact. It is not battery, be28
cause there is no physical impact or contact.
2. The authorities which allow an action evidently do
not regard the existence (or presence) of a particular name as
an essential prerequisite.
3. The authorities which deny a recovery do not generally consider the absence of a particular name as a sole
sufficient objection to the maintenance of the action. The
judicial opinion which we regard as. the ablest of those
opposed to recovery (that of ALLEN, J., in Spade v. R. R.)
practically asserts that there is only one strong argument
and South Carolina, Mack v. R. R., 29 So. 905, (1898); and see dictum in
Cal. Noum v. R. R., iii Cal. 669, (1896)."
"A recovery has been denied by the Privy Council, England, Coultas v.
R. R., L. R. 13 App. Cases, 222, (1888); and the Supreme Courts of New York,
Mitchell v. R. R., 151 N. Y. 107, (897); Pennsylvania, Ewing v. R. R., 147
Pa. 40, (1892); and Massachusetts, Spade v. R. R., 168 Mass. 285, (1897); and
dictum, Braun v. Craven, 175 III. 403, (1899)."
The conflict of authority continues.
For collection of later cases on both sides, see elaborate notes in 3 L. R.
A. N. S.

29; 22

L. R. A. N. S. 1073; L. R. Ann. 1915 D. 830.

Two of the aolest arguments in favor of recovery are found in the articles
by Prof. Bohlen, in 41 Am. Law Register, N. S. 141; which Prof. Ames calls
"excellent" (i Ames & Smith's Cases on Torts, Ed. I91O, p. 28, note i); and in
the discussion by the writer of the note in 3 L. R. A. N. S. p. 29 et seq.
The opinion of Judge Allen, in Spade v. Lynn & Boston R. R., 168 Mass.
is we think, the ablest presentation of the case against recovery.
285, (1897),
2
81n defining battery, ante, we have said that some jurists would refuse to
call non-hostile contact a "battery," but might apply to it some such specific
name as "negligent, damaging, contact." But neither term would include the
present supposed case where there is no contact, either hostile or damaging.
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against recovery; and that argument does not consist in the
lack of a specific particular name for the alleged tort.
In Chapter XXV of Bishop on Non-Contract Law, the
author enumerates various instances where an action of tort
is held maintainable for conduct which does not come under
any specific class of torts which is commonly designated by a
particular name. One instance is as follows:
"Sect. 488. Suing without authority.-If one brings a
suit against another in the name of a third person who has
not authorized it, he is. answerable to the other in damages,
though he acts without malice, so that the wrong is not malicious prosecution. It is simply a thing done unauthorized
by law, wherefrom the complainr:g person has suffered."
The person so bringing the suit is liable, although he
mistakenly supposed himself authorized to sue in the name
of the third person, and although he was not actuated by any
improper motive, and although there was a good cause of
action in favor of the third person who was named as plaintiff. His good faith, and his honest belief (even on reasonable grounds) that he has authority, does not save him. He
acted at his peril when he used the name of another person
in instituting suit. He is absolutely liable if he did not
have authority.29
This differs from the specific tort, generally known by
the name of malicious prosecution, or malicious institution of
a civil suit. Here the plaintiff must prove wrong motive
(alias malice,) and want of probable cause. Here proof of
these facts is not essential to the maintenance of the action
(although the damages might be enhanced by showing
them). The gist of the action is the want of authority.
Again, the tort here differs from the specific tort designated by the name "abuse of lawful process." There, process lawfully issued is improperly used to effect an object
not within its proper scope; e. g., to compel the defendant
2Bond v. Chapin, 1844, 8 Metcalf, 31; Foster v. Dow, 1849, 29 Maine,
442; Moulton v. Lowe, 1851, 32 Maine, 466; Bigelow, J., in Smith v. Hyndman,
1852, io Cushing, 554; 3 Sedgwick on Damages, 9th ed. s. 839.
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to give up possession of a document, not the legal object of
the process. 30 Here, there never was lawful process. The
writ was unlawful ab initio.
In a case like James Bond v. Chapin, 3' recovery is not

based on a fiction contract, as in Collen v. Wright, 32 and
Starkey v. Bank of England.-3 Chapin, when bringing suit
in the name of Thomas Bond against James Bond, made no
representation to James Bond, whereby James Bond was
induced to enter into a transaction. He is not now held
liable in contract on the fiction ground that he impliedly
warranted that he had authority to sue in the name of Thomas
Bond. He is now held liable in tort for suing in the name of
Thomas Bond without authority.
Instead of classifying wrongs by the nature of the right
invaded, they may be distinguished according to the nature
3
of the instrument or method whereby the harm is inflicted. 4
One prominent method of inflicting harm is by the use of
language, written or oral. 35
The use of language, under special circumstances, may,
as we have seen, constitute a method of damaging the right
of personal immunity. It is the most common (if not practically the only) method of inflicting damage upon (of violating) the right to reputation. It also constitutes one method
of damaging (violating) the right of property.
Under the general title of Harm done by the Use of
Language, there are two classes (or subdivisions) of specific
30

Pound, 652-3, and notes; Ames & Smith Cases, Ed. I9io, 616, note;
Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 2nd ed. 578-9.
318 Metcalf 31, 1844.
321857, 8 El. & BI. 647.
3L. R. 1903, App. Cases, II4.

3See Innes, Principles of Torts, Preface V to VII; Holland on Jurisprudence, 358th Ed., 291-292.
Before proceeding to discuss attempts to classify injuries inflicted by the
use of language, it seems proper to call attention to the opinion of a very acute
lawyer-that such injuries do not admit of classification for any useful purpose.
In 6 Amer. Law Review, p. 612, Mr. N. St. John Green, speaking of the second
edition of Townsend on Slander and Libel, says: "Mr. Townsend has an introductory chapter upon language as a means of effecting injury. We do not
think injuries done by means of language can be classified together for any useful purpose.

.

.

.

We are sorry to see so much learning and talent and

patient research expended in an attempt to classify under general principles a
branch of the law which in our opinion does not admit of such classification."
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torts, commonly designated by particular names, viz., De-

famation (divided into Libel and Slander), and Deceit.36
But, although these two sub-divisions stand out prominently
and might be supposed to comprise the only torts under that
general head which are called by particular names, yet they

confessedly do not include all actionable torts falling under
the general description of harm done by the use of language.
A striking proof of this proposition is found by comparing

the legal meaning of Defamation and Deceit with the facts
in the leading case of Ratcliffe v. Evans.37
Defamation consists in the publication to third persons
of a false and defamatory statement respecting another person (plaintiff in an action). A defamatory statement is one
which has a tendency to injure the reputation of the person
to whom it refers; which tends "to diminish the good opinion
that other people have of him."
The wrong of Deceit (the foundation of an action for
Deceit) is defined in law, in "a narrow and specific sense,"
as consisting in the wrong of misleading the plaintiff, so that
he causes harm to himself by his own mistaken act. In
other words it consists "in false statements made to the
plaintiff himself, whereby he is induced to act to his own
loss. "38
'sAttempts have been made to establish, or recognize, particular names
for other torts under this general head. To some to these attempts we shall
refer later.
37L. R. (1892), 2 Q. B. 524.
38See Salmond on Torts, 4th ed. pp. 494, 5o9. Bower on Actionable
Misrepresentation, sec. 453.
"Wrongs of fraud or misrepresentation are of two kinds, essentially
distinct: (a) The wrong of deceiving the plaintiff, so that he causes harm to
himself by his own mistaken act; (b) The wrong of deceiving other persons, so
that they by their mistaken acts cause harm to the plaintiff. The first of these
injuries may be called, in a narrow and specific sense of the term, the wrong of
Deceit; the second has no recognized distinctive title, and in default of a better
designation it will here be called the wrong of Injurious Falsehood." Salmond,
Torts, 4th ed. p. 494. Compare Bower on Actionable Misrepresentation, see.
453.
"The wrong of deceit consists, as we have seen, in false statements made
to the plaintiff himself, whereby he is induced to act to his own loss. The wrong
of injurious falsehood, on the other hand, consists in false statements made to
other persons concerning the plaintiff, whereby he suffers loss through the
action of those others. The one consists in misrepresentations made to the
plaintiff, the other in misrepresentations made concerning him. Salmond,
Torts, 4th ed. p. 504.
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Now consider the case of Ratcliffe v. Evans. 39 The
plaintiff alleged that he had for many years, at a certain
place, carried on the business of an engineer and boilermaker, under the name of "Ratcliffe & Sons;" and that he
had suffered damage by the defendant falsely and maliciously publishing, in his newspaper, words importing "that
the plaintiff had ceased to carry on his business of engineer
and boiler-maker, and that the firm of Ratcliffe & Sons did
not then exist."
At the trial, plaintiff proved the publication of the
statements complained of, and that they were untrue. He
also proved a general loss of business since the publication.
In answer to questions left to them, the jury found "that the
words did not reflect upon the plaintiff's character, and were
not libellous; that the statement that the firm of Ratcliffe
& Sons was extinct was not published bona fide; and that
the plaintiff's business suffered injury to the extent of £120
from the publication of that statement."
The Commissioner of Assize gave judgement for plaintiff for £120; and an appeal from his judgment was dismissed
by the Court of Appeal (Lord Esheri M. R., Bowen and
Fry L. J. J.).
The Court rightly held that there was here an actionable wrong; but it was not the wrong designated by the
specific legal name of Deceit or Defamation.
It was not Deceit, within the legal meaning of that
term. The statement, though consciously false, was not
made to the plaintiff himself, nor was the plaintiff thereby
induced to himself take any action. He did not suffer loss
on account of any act of his own induced by his own mistaken
reliance on the defendant's statement.4 0
As to Defamation, the opinion is explicit to the point
that this statement was not defamatory.
Bowen, L. J. "It was treated in the pleadings as a
defamatory statement or libel; but this suggestion was
Q. B. 524.
CSee Salmond on Torts, 4th Ed. pp. 494, 504.
-L.
0 R. (1892) 2
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.negatived, and the verdict of the jury proceeded upon the
view that the writing was a false statement purposely made
.about the manufactures of the plaintiff, which was intended
41
to, and did in fact, cause him damage."
"That an action will lie for written or oral falsehoods,
not actionable per se nor even defamatory, where they are
maliciously published, where they are calculated in the
ordinary course of things to produce, and where they do
produce, actual damage, is established law. Such an action
is not one of libel or slander, but an action on the case for
-damage wilfully and intentionally done without just occasion or excuse, analagous to an action for slander of title. ,42
Further on, 4 Bowen L. J. speaks of the present action
:as: "brought for a malicious falsehood intentionally published in a newspaper about the plaintiff's business-a falsehood which is not actionable as a personal libel, and which
*.,44
'
.
is not defamatory in itselfIf, under the general head of Harm by the Use of Lan-guage, Deceit and Defamation are to be considered the only
classes of specific torts designated by particular names, the
result will be that a large number of torts, of frequent occurrence, must be treated as torts without particular names;
and some of these are torts which, in popular speech, would
be classed under Deceit, though they do not fall within the
narrow definition which the law has affixed to that term.
Very naturally, jurists have attempted to establish, or re.cognize, particular names for other groups of torts coming
under the general head of Harm by the Use of Language.
-Some names would have a wide scope. Other names are
used to describe what have been called "specialized varieties" of harm thus caused.
41p. 527.
42p. 527.
43
p. 529.

41A plaintiff does not necessarily fail to maintain his action because the
language is non-defamatory but he is obliged to prove his case much more
fully. Certain points whose existence is "presumed" in a case of defamation
are required to be proved if the language is non-defamatory. This is clearly
brought out in Odgers on Libel and Slander, 5th ed. 77, in the chapter entitled:
"Actions on the Case for Words which cause Damage."
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Two suggested names, intended to cover a very large
number of torts are: "Injurious Falsehood" suggested by
Mr. Salmond,' "and "Malicious Language."
Both these terms seem to us objectionable. Both are
expressed in ambiguous phrase; and their adoption (the
adoption of this nomenclature) will lead to disputes as to
the meaning intended to be conveyed thereby (annexed
thereto).
As to "Injurious Falsehood." "Falsehood," as well
as other terms derived from the root "False," is used in two
very different significations. It may mean conscious falsity
on the part of the utterer: i. e., that a statement is not believed to be true by the one who utters it. Or it may mean
only that it is not true in point of fact; although the utterer
honestly believed it to be correct, and may even have had
reasonable ground for his belief.46
"Injurious" is also a word used in more than one meaning. "Injury" in its literal signification, as a compound of
the two Latin words in and jus, means against law, unlawful,
an infringement of a legal right. But 'f injury" is frequently
useal as synonymous with "damage;" thereby causing much
47
confusion.
If, in the proposed name, "injurious" is used in the
sense of "unlawful," there is nothing to show when, or why,
a falsehood should be regarded as unlawful.48 If the word
"injurious" is intended to be used in the sense of "damaging," it would be better to substitute the latter term.
The name "Malicious Language" is not less objectionable than "Injurious Falsehood." The use of the word
"Malice," and its derivatives, has introduced more confusion into the law than another word. 49 It is frequently
45See
4
6See
7

Salmond, Torts, 4th ed. pp. 494, 504.
Bower on Actionable Misrepresentation, sec. 468.
4 See i7 Columbia Law Review, 386-387; especially citations in page

387, note 20.

4SAIl untrue statements are not actionable.

Law, 3rd
ed., sec. 701,
4

See Markby, Elements of

702.

9See L. C. Krauthoff, 21 Reports Am. Bar Association, 335, 338.
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used in the sense of "malice in law," or "legal malice."
When so used it is a pure fiction; introduced into the law
by the invention of one fiction and got out again by the in-vention of another fiction. 0 When used to indicate a reality,
it has various meanings quite diverse from each other.5s
Many eminent lawyers avoid its use when possible, and
-would be glad to have the term omitted from the law. 62
This might seem the proper place to consider all other
attempts to establish particular names for groups of torts
"See Mr. Green, 6 Am. Law Rev. 6o9-6io; i Street, Foundations of Legal
Liability, 317; Gaynor J., 1896, in Prince v. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 16 New
York Miscellaneous,
x86, 188; Odgers, Outline of the Law of Libel, 112-1x6.
61"The word (or its derivatives) is sometimes used to denote morally wrong
intent or morally wrong motive; or an act done intentionally without legal
justification or excuse, though without any moral fault; or merely a defend.ant's knowledge of a particular fact." See 6o University of Pennsylvania Law
Review, 368, note 5.
Us •. . ."it is submitted that the less use we make of it the better."
Pollock, Torts, 6th ed., 272.
In 14 Law Quarterly Review, 132, speaking of the discussion of principles

in a recent case, Sir Frederick Pollock said: "May we hope that, so far as civil
-actions are concerned, it will enable us to get rid of the perplexed and perplexing word 'malice' altogether."
In South Wales Miners' Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co., L. R., (I9o5)
A. C. 239, 255; Lord Lindley said: " . . . it conduces to clearness in discussing such cases as these to drop the word 'malice' altogether and to substitute for it the meaning which is really intended to be conveyed by it."
In 18 Harv. Law Rev. 422, note i, Prof. Ames said: "If so 'slippery' a
word, to borrow Lord Bower's adjective, were eliminated from legal arguments
and opinions, only good would result."
Compare also statements and quotations in articles by present writers:
-6o Univ. Pa. Law Review, 368-371; 462-467; 13 Columbia Law Review, 2223; 27 Yale Law Journal, 162-163.

'The dicta in the House of Lords, in Derry v. Peek, 1889, L. R. I4 App.
Cases, 337, are regarded in England as establishing the rule of non-liability for
negligent language. This rule is regarded by some eminent English jurists as
intrinsically unjust, and is not adopted in various parts of the United States.
m
Harv. Law
Rev. 184;
SeeI4authorities
under
collected
and contending
commented that
conditions,
uponthere
in an is,
article
bycertain
the present
writer
from contract,
liabity
does sometimes
for negligent
language;impose
in other
words,
law, distinguished
a duty takethat "the
reasonable ascare
to tell the
truth."
n
If the latter
w view I should become generally adopted, and is intocodtos
govern in
matters of classification and nomenclature, the courts will recognize and designate
"by
names
morewould
than one
of misstatements
"other which
than Defamation
a special
nd
Deceit."
There
be, class
at least,
two special classes,
can be de-

scribed roughly as follows:
i.
did not honestly
his statement.
2. Where
Where the
the defendant
defendant honestly
believed believe
his statement
but was under a
aduty
to use care to ascertain the truth and neglected that duty.
In other wards: ( ) Consciously false misstatements, resulting in damage.
(2) Negligent misstatements, resulting in damage.
It would, of course, be desirable (if possible) to frame the name of the
.second class in such a way as to indicate when a duty to use care exists. As to
-this, see suggestions in 14 Harv. Law Rev., p. 188, p. 195-6.
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coming under the general head of "Harm by the Use of Language other than Defamation or Deceit;" and confined to
cases where the defendant's conduct is a foundation for an
action of tort to recover damages. But the full consideration of this question does not fall within the limited scope of
the present paper. The object (purpose) of this paper, as
stated on an earlier page, is to consider only those questions
of classification and nomenclature which arise as to points
upon which the substantive law of torts is settled; in otherwords, as to cases in regard to which it is now generally admitted that an action of tort would lie. As previously
stated in regard to an earlier topic, we are not now attempting
to settle disputed points as to the substantive law of tortsHence we do not here attempt to discuss the disputed
point as to whether there is liability (and, if so, under what
limitations or restrictions) for negligent use of language; in
other words, whether there is ever a legal duty, except when
created by contract, to be careful in the use of language.
And it follows that we do not now consider how the existenceof such liability or duty would affect questions of classification and nomenclature. 53
Thus far, we have been dealing in a fragmentary way
with a few specific instances and illustrations under thegeneral topic of this paper. It is now desirable to take a
broader view of the subject.
What proportion of torts have particular names? It
has been said that "most wrongs have no special names."

5

4-

There is a sense in which the statement is true, but anothersense in which it is not true. The first twelve chapters,
(Chapters XIII to XXIV) of Book III, Bishop on NonContract Law, are "each devoted to a wrong to which the law has given a name." Then follows Chapter XXV on
61"Most wrongs have no special names. But certain of the more common
wrongs, such as trespass or conversion, are distinguished by names. These
should be defined, i. e., in the case of each it should be pointed out what particular combination of the elements that are essential to any wrong are elements
in the particular wrong in question." Prof. H. T. Terry, 17 Columbia Law
Review, 38o; and see Bishop non-Contract Law, sec. 494.
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"Wrongs not Named," of which the author gives various
distinct examples. If each "Unnamed Tort" that can be
found is regarded as constituting in itself a separate variety
of tort, then the number of these separate varieties may, in
the aggregate, largely exceed the number of specific classes
to which the law has given particular names. But the number of cases included in the specific classes which have particular names will probably largely exceed the number of
cases included in the unnamed varieties. Take, for instance,
i3oo litigated cases of torts on the docket of a common law
court. Suppose that 1200 of these cases are included in
twelve specific classes which are designated by particular
names. Suppose that each of the remiaining IOO cases differ
essentially from each other, and thus constitute ioo distinct
varieties of" Unnamed Torts." Here, ex hypothesi, we should
have more varieties of "Unnamed Torts" than of specific
classes of torts bearing particular names; there being in
fact IoO of the former and only 12 of the latter. But there
would be 1200 cases included in the 12 classes having particular names, while only IOO cases would be included in the
ioo different varieties of "Unnamed Torts."
Upon what principle, with what aim, should cases be
classified as having particular names, or as belonging to
"Unnamed Torts?" In adopting particular names, what
dangers are to be avoided?
As opposite extremes to be avoided, we may speak, on
one hand, of names that are too broad or vague; names that
are so general that they would include almost everything,
in fact including utterly incongruous elements. And, on
the other hafid, we may speak of names that are too minute,
the mistake of over-division.
It is neither practicable nor useful to establish a distinct
name for every possible concrete case of tort. This difficulty, in another form, confronts jurists who favor codification. They admit that it may be inexpedient to state general principles without adding any subsidiary rules. But
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they believe it undesirable to attempt to add subsidiary
rules sufficiently numerous and minute to point out unerringly the exact decision in every conceivable concrete case.
Sub-rules, stated with this purpose, "would be very complicated, full of fine distinctions and hard to apply in practice. "5
As an example of a name that is too broad, too general,
we may instance the term "Private Nuisance." This term
has been severely criticized. Witness the following statements:
Judge Cooley56 says: "It is very seldom indeed, that
even a definition of nuisance has been attempted, for the
reason that, to make it sufficiently comprehensive, it is
necessary to make it so general it is likely to define nothing."
Mr. Garrett57 says: "It is indeed impossible, having
regard to the wide range of subject-matter embraced under
the term nuisance, to frame any general definition, . . ."
Pollock, C. B., in a dissenting opinion,"8 says: "I do
not think that the nuisance for which an action will lie is
capable of any legal definition which will be applicable to all
cases and useful in deciding them."59
Prof. E. R. Thayer60 says of nuisance: "It is so comprehensive a term, and its content is so heterogeneous, that it
55

See Terry, Leading Principles of Anglo-American Law, s. 581, s. 61o;
See also article by present writer, 25
Harv. Law Rev. 315.
",6Torts,
2d ed., 672.
"7Nuisances, 3d ed. p. 4.
2 Austin, Jurisprudence, 3d ed. 687.

183 Best & Smith, p. 79.

19As an example of attempts to frame a definition of private nuisance, we
may start with Blackstone, and then amend his statement by additions from
Stephen and Cooley.
"A private nuisance is defined to be anything done to the hurt or annoyance of the lands, tenements, or hereditaments of another. " 3 Blackstone Com.
216. Blackstone's definition is amended in 3 Stephen's Com., ist ed., 499, by
adding-"and not amounting to a trespass." This is further amended by
Cooley (Torts, 2d ed. 67o) by inserting the word "wrongfully" between "anything" and "done," so that the twice amended statement will now read-" A
private nuisance is defined to be anything wrongfully done to the hurt or annoyance of the lands, tenements, or hereditaments of another, and not amounting
to a trespass."
Jenks' definition of Nuisance (Digest of English Civil Law, Book 2, Part
3, p. 391) contains the statement: "The fact that such an annoyance, prejudice
or disturbance legally amounts to trespass, is no bar to an action of Nuisance."
As to the distinction between nuisance and trespass, see Salmond on
Torts, 4th ed., 213.
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scarcely does more than state a legal conclusion that for one
or another of widely varying reasons the thing stigmatized
as a nuisance violates the rights of others."
Judge Innes 61 says: "Nuisances comprise a group of
miscellaneous torts, properly classifiable under several of
the principal classes of torts."
.
many wrongs are in.
Dr. Bishop 62 says: "
differently termed nuisance or something else, at the convenience or whim of the writer. Thus, injuries to ways, to
private lands, various injuries through negligence, wrongs
harmful to the physical health, disturbances of the peace,
and numberless other things are often or commonly spoken
of as nuisances while equally they are called by the other
name, and the other name may include other things also
which are not nuisances."
The term "nuisance," when used to denote an actionable tort, does not explain the reason for actionability. -The
wrongs classed under the general head of nuisance "are
breaches of various duties."
Prof. Terry63 says: "The word nuisance in this sense,
therefore, does not stand for any conception which enters
as an element into the definition of the wrong and which
needs to be itself separately described as one of the praecogwoscend& of the definition, but is a name for the wrong itself.
Its only use is as a term of classification applied to a group
into which certain wrongs are gathered for convenience of
reference. " 6Mr. Salmond 65 says: "Public and private nuisances.are
not in ieality of the sam6 genus at all .
.
.
Private
nuisances' are themselves of two kinds . , ...
Here,
again, it does not seem possible to include these two kinds of
nuisances within any single definition. They are not in
Harv. Law Rev. 3M.
'Principles of Torts, Preface X
ONon-Contract Law, sec. 411, note 1.
$Leading Principles of Anglo-American Law, sec. 434.
"This reminds one of the substance of Mr. Austin's criticism of another
term; viz.: that it is merely a sink, into which certain kinds of harm are thrown
without discrimination. See 2 Austin, Jur. 3d ed., 945.
"6Torts, 4th Ed., pp. 209-20.
6027

112

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

reality two species of the same generic injury, but different
injuries which happen to be called by the same name."
The term nuisance is ambiguous. It has more than one
general meaning. Prof. Terry 6 says: "The word nuisance
is used on our law to denote sometimes an act or omission
with certain of its consequences, and sometimes a thing.
Those acts and omissions which are so-called are wrongs."
The thing sometimes called a nuisance "is not necessarily
wrongful."
Sir William Erle 67 says:

"

the use of the

word 'nuisance' in the discussion prolongs the dispute, because it means both annoyance that is actionable, and also
that which is not actionable; and where the question is,
whether an annoyance is actionable, the word nuisance
introduces an equivocation which is fatal to any hope of a
"
. . . . The confusion which perclear settlement."
.
.
.
"is an example
vades the reports" of certain cases

of the ill effects of the word 'nuisance' upon the
discussion."
From time to time, courts will recognize the existence of
new groups, made up of hitherto unnamed torts (torts which
hitherto have not been designated by particular names);
and names will be invented (suggested) to describe each of
these new groups.
What occasion for new groups or new names? Largely,
changes in modes of living or of doing business "as the habits
of men's life are modified by new inventions, and new cases,
produced by such modifications, arise for determination. "&
Thus, the present controversy as to a Right to Privacy
has become specially important by reason of the invention
of instantaneous photography; which affords easy and frequent opportunities for interference with such a right, if the
right is held to exist. The general attention of the profes6"Leading Principles of Anglo-American Law, s. 434. And see same
author in 25 Yale Law Journal, 181.
671n appendix to Brand.v. Hammersmith &c. R. Co., 1866, L. R. 2 Q. B.
223, 247-8.
nSee Pollock, Expansion of the Common Law, 125.
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sion was called to this subject, in i8go, by the article of
Messrs. Warren and Brandeis in 4 Harv. Law Rev., 193.
Since that time there has been much discussion and various
conflicting decisions have been rendered.69 The law is still
unsettled, and is not to be discussed in the present paper.
In passing, however, we may note a few points. In
1883, Sir J. F. Stephen'7 suggested that the difference might
be met by extending the doctrines hitherto existing under
the law of libel. Such extension seems to us impracticable;
and it would not cover all the cases now seeking a remedy.
The claim is now made that the law should protect a right
of privacy which is distinct from a right of reputation.
So the admission is sometimes made that the right of
privacy may, in certain cases, be protected as included in the
right of property. But this again does not meet all claims
now made as applications of the alleged right to privacy.
If the existence of a right of privacy, in whole or in part,
is conceded, it might be said that we have a ready-made
name for the newly recognized tort; viz., Violation of, or
Interference with, the Right of Privacy. But there may still
be a conflict as to what Large Division or Main Division
this Sub-division (this specific class) shall be placed under.
Some authorities, which do not concede the full claim, might
say: It belongs under the Right of Property. Other authorities which admit the full right claimed, might class it under
the Right of Persons. Sir J. F. Stephen might possibly
have classed it under Right of Reputation.
These suggestions are given as indicating some of the
difficulties of the question; not as affording material for a
final settlement.
Here it may be noticed that new inventions and improved
methods may lessen the danger of certain conduct (the
danger of certain uses of property hitherto regarded as extra"For a collection of authorities and comments thereon, see 6 Virginia
Law Review, 376-377; 5 Cornell Law Quarterly, 177-181; 68 U. of P. Law
Review, 284-287; i8 Mich. Law Review, 437-438; 20 Columbia Law Review,
ioo-ioI; See also Prof. Plumb, 28 Harvard Law Review, 362-365.
702 History of Criminal Law of England, 385.
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hazardous), so far as to remove some cases from the list of
instances where the law imposes absolute liability, and instead leave the actor liable only for failure to use care.
Thus, in the case of the old non-dirigible balloon or
non-steerable airship, an aviator, whose machine came in
contact with the land or with a person on the land, was
likely to be held absolutely liable irrespective of fault. But
the practical difference between this case and that of the
modern dirigible balloon or steerable airship has been pointed
out by Pollock.71 If a more perfected airship should at
some future day, become controllable as fully as is now the
case with a vessel on the sea or a horse drawing a carriage on
the land, it is not impossible that the rigidity of the law may
be relaxed, and the aviator who comes in contact with the
land may be held liable only in case of failure to use care.
The suggestion has been made that the aviator, while not
an insurer against accident, may be held under a duty to use
"consummate care." 72
Not only will names be invented, or suggested, for newly
recognized groups of torts; but there will be a revision of
some names heretofore given to other groups. Sometimes
the former name may be amended; sometimes it may be
entirely rejected and a different name substituted. Some
names came into use through "premature generalization."
Some were based on mistakes as to analogies; where the supposed analogies did not exist at all, or where the weight of
analogy was contra.73
An instance of a name likely to be entirely rejected is
"Slander of Title" (or, to use the broader term, "Slander of
Property. ") Two of our best legal writers prefer to substinTorts, 6th ed. 37-38; ioth ed. 38-39.
"See Pollock, Torts, ioth ed. p. 39, note k. Compare Judge Baldwin,
9 M.ch. Law Rev. 24; Canney v. Rochester Ass'n, 76 N. H. 6o (i97i); I Wigmore, Cases
on Torts, top of p. 62.
73
"The treating together of distinct things because they have an unessential similarity cannot tend to the clearness of ideas." N. St. John Green,
6. Am. Law Review, 612.

TORTS WITHOUT PARTICULAR NAMES

tute for it "Disparagement of Title" (or "Disparagement of
Property").14
The name "Slander of Title" seems to have formerly
been approved on the supposition that statements affecting
a plaintiff's title to property were of the same nature as, or at
least were closely analagous to, statements affecting a plaintiff's personal reputation or character. But in reality defamation of reputation 75 and disparagement of title are distinct torts. In the latter case, the right in the plaintiff
which is infringed is not a right to personal reputation, but
a right in connection with property; a right to hold property
unimpaired in value (free from depreciation in value) by
untrue statements concerning the title of the owner. Judges
obviously "desire to make it more difficult to maintain an
action for disparagement of property than an action for
defamation of character. Personal reputation is protected
against impairment by language more effectually than
interests in property are protected against impairment by
such method."
In 13 Columbia Law Review, p. 130, the present writer
has specifically stated the differences between the rules of
law applied to actions for defamation of personal reputation
and actions for disparagement of title. The comparisons
there made justify the conclusion that disparagement of
title is not a mere branch of defamation. Professor Bigelow
was right in saying that "slander of title" (as he terms it)
has "a place of its own in the law of torts." ' 76
74
Bower, Code of Actionable Defamation, p. 242 (2), and note (b); Bohlen,
Select Cases on Torts, Ed. 1915, Vol. , p. 873 el seg.
"'Disparagement' is the term used in most of the later cases, and, for this
reason and because it both dissociates the act which constitutes it from acts of
defamation proper, and does not suggest either oral or documentary expression
as an element in its composition, it is adopted in the text." (Bower, p. 242,
note (b).
"'Disparagement' means and includes any publication of matter, the
meaning and effect of which is to deny or cast doubt upon the existence or validity of any person's right, claim, title, or interest to, or in, any property, or to
depreciate or disparage the merits, utility, qualities, or value of any person's
property. . . ." Bower, Code, 242 (2)
76"Reputation means and includes:-in the case of a natural person,-the
esteem in which he is held, or the goodwill entertained towards him, or the

confidence reposed in him by other persons,

.

.

."

Bower, Code, Article

5, P. 3-4.
7
6Bigelow on Torts, 7th ed., s. i8o. And see 16 Law Quarterly Review,
313.
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Personally we think that harm and confusion will result
from classing Disparagement of Title under what may be
called the compromise phrase "Quasi-Defamation."
Undoubtedly, there is the very high authority of Mr. Bower
for such classification. But see his frank admission as to
77
the difference from "actionable defamation proper."
Great difficulty has been occasioned by the use of
names due to theories based on pure fiction. The fictitious
nature of the theories is now conceded; and the names are
admitted to be incorrect. Is it too late to correct the error,
abolish the use of these names, and substitute other names
founded upon truth? Some lawyers seem to think that a
name admittedly erroneous and founded on pure fiction
ought to be retained, unless and until we can suggest a better
name. They, perhaps, have in mind the rule that defendant who pleads in abatement must "give the plaintiff a
better writ." But we submit that failure to give a particular name may be preferable to adopting an entirely erroneous name.
Better reasons may now be given for some correct results which were formerly reached by the use of fiction. The
results thus reached need not be discarded with the fictions;
but it does not follow that the fiction phraseology and fiction
reasons should be retained. 78
An instance of an erroneous name, based on pure fiction,
is "Constructive Fraud," first used prominently in discussing questions of equity jurisdiction; and later as to actions
of tort. This term has been used in cases where there is no
"7See Bower, Code of Actionable Defamation, p. 234, note i, and pp. 240241.

As to how the term "slander" came to be used in this connection, and as
to the various meanings, which have heretofore been attached to the word, see
Bower,7 Code of Actionable Defamation, p. 267-270.
8See Prof. Williston, 24 Harv. Law Rev. p. 434. See also 27 Yale Law
Journal, p. 153, notes 38 and 39.

As to the expediency of maldng changes in existing classifications or in

legal nomenclature; see 3o Harv. Law Rev., 418-421; and compare 3o Harv.

Law Rev. 241-242. As to the expediency, at'the present time, of entirely
-abandoning the use of fiction in law; of entirely discarding the use of fiction
phrases and fiction reasons; see 27 Yale Law Journal, 151-155.

TORTS WITHOUT PARTICULAR NAMES

tinge of actual fraud. The title covers more than i6o pages
in the first edition of Story on Equity Jurisprudence, published in 1835.
Judge Story, at the beginning of his long chapter on
Constructive Fraud, has sometimes been regarded as almost
apologizing for doctrines which (as he says) "may seem to
be of an artificial if not of an arbitrary, character." 79 But
Mr. Bower has recently said that the apology should have
been made, "not for the doctrines, which are admirable, but
for the nomenclature, which is vile. . . . The 'arbitrariness' is in describing' these acts by a name in popular
use to which they do not answer . . . instead of simply
laying down that certain acts and omissions are prohibited,
irrespective of fraud or honesty, on the ground of the tendency and temptation to evil which would otherwise result."so
The objections to the term "Constructive Fraud" (including the confusion resulting from its use) have been
-strongly stated by authorities entitled to great respect. 8
7i Story, Eq. Juris.8st ed., S. 258.
aoBower, Actionable Misrepresentation, App. s. 455, p. 387.
Pollock,1 Law of Fraud in British India, 15, 16, 41, 42.

Compare

See, for example, Lord Romilly, M. R., In regriculturists'Cattle Ins. Co.,
1867, L. R_ Eq. 769, 771-772; and Ewart on Estoppel, 160, 232, 286, 259-261,
S7, 98. The reasonable conclusion is that the term should be dropped from the
law. The high authority of Mr. Pomeroy is opposed to this conclusion, although
that very able writer recognizes the objections to the term. See 2 Pomeroy, Eq.
Juris., Ed. 8he-s882, s. 874, note 2; and see also s. 922.
See further, as to this term, article by present writer, 27 Yale Law Journal,
319-322.

As to the use of such expressions as "Constructive Fraud," see the elabor-

-ate essay in Appendix A, in Bower on Actionable Misrepresentation, sec. 445sec 477.

The learned author speaks of the "discrepancy between the artificial

nomenclature of the courts and the ordinary sense of the community" (s- 459);
and regrets the use of "fraud" by the courts in any sense other than the popular
meaning of dishonesty. "Hence it is," he says, "that judges have been compelled todiscriminate, with painful precision, between 'constructive,' 'legal,'
technical,'' 'artificial, ' 'uconsciou,I or 'equitable' fraud on the one hand,

.and fraud in its normal and natural and ordinary sense, variously described as
'actual,' 'positive,' 'personal,' 'moral,' 'intentional,' 'conscious,' or 'in the
offensive sense,' on the other; as if fraud could ever be described as other than
actual, positive, personal, moral, intentional, conscious, or could be used in any
but an offensive sense, except for the purpose of the antithesis necessitated by
the initial mistake in scientific terminology." Section 457.
In secs. 461 and 462,. the author calls attention to the importance of
terminology:
"The importance of terminology in any department of knowledge which
ranks as a science, above all in such a science as jurisprudence, one would suppose to be manifest. And yet, in nearly every branch of English law, precision
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Views which, until recently, prevailed as to the law of
procedure (the law of remedies), have given rise to the frequent employment of fictions. In modern times, until the
very recent statutory changes in the law as to forms of action,
it was commonly assumed that (apart from suits to obtain
possession of specific articles of property) there were only
two great divisions of causes of personal action; viz., contract and tort; and that there could be no cause of personal
action unless it could be classed under one of these two
heads.82
At the present time we think it should be recognized
that there are three great divisions of causes of personal
action:
I. Breach of genuine contract.
2. Tort, in the sense of fault.
3. So-called 'Absolute Liability' imposed by courts,
where there is neither breach of genuine contract nor fault.
Under this classification the application of the term 'tort'

should be restricted to class

2.83

The third class (cases of "absolute liability") is made
up mainly of two sets of subjects:
Sub-division (a): Cases where recovery has heretofore
been enforced in an action of contract; but where there is in
fact no real contract; only a fiction contract.8 4
and lucidity in nomenclature, as well as in classification and formal expression
generally, has been either openly professed to be, or in practice treated as, a
thing of no account, or, at any rate, of quite subsidiary interest." It is, he says,
an old fallacy "that things and thoughts are the realities, and that names do
not matter. The truth is that terminology reacts on thought. Loose definitions, encourage loose conceptions. Words, maxims, aphorisms, phrases, which
are good servants, but bad masters, have a tendency to dominate ideas, and,
when once this perverted and unnatural sovereignty is established, there is
danger of a Saturnalian orgy in which Mind, the Master, will wait upon Language, the Slave." He adds: "The violation of the first law of scientific terminology, viz. that each term should express a distinct concept, and one only,.
and should always be used in one and the same sense, has been conspicuously
violated in the judicial maltreatment of that unhappy expression 'fraud'."
As to the importance of correcting "Defects in Terminology," see fuller
discussion in Bower's Code of the Law of Actionable Defamation, Appendix
XXI, section 2, p. 487-489.
81See 3o Harv. Law Rev. 242; 27 Yale Law Journal, 325.
"'See
3o Harv. Law Review, 243.
' 4See 3o Harv. Law Rev., 243, 425-6.

TORTS WITHOUT PARTICULAR NAMES

Sub-division (b): Cases where recovery has heretofore
been enforced in an action of tort; but where there is in fact
no actual fault on the part of the defendant.
Sub-division (a), which is generally treated of in this
country under the name Quasi-Contract, is not concerned
with the subject of this paper so much as Sub-division (b).
But, in passing, three points as to Quasi-Contracts are men85
tioned in the note below.
As to Sub-division (b), under Absolute Liability. If
the law recognizes (under the name of Absolute Liability) a
third division of causes of personal action, distinct from
contract and from tort in the sense of fault, a considerable
number of cases heretofore classed under tort will fall under
this third division. In 30 Harv. Law. Rev. 319-332, the
present writer has attempted to enumerate some cases which
would then cease to be classed under tort. In various instances it is hard to draw the line. There are cases where
there is conflict as to when to apply the doctrine of extrahazardous peril, where liability is imposed in the absence
of faults 6 And there is a growing tendency to extend the
scope of negligence; and to base liability on the existence of
that fault instead of holding that the case is one of absolute
liability. 87 But, at all events, some cases will be transferred
851.
In the cases grouped under this head, there is no genuine agreement,
and the "contract" heretofore alleged in the declaration is a pure fiction. See
Keener on Quasi-Contract, pp. 5, 14, 15; Woodward on Quasi-Contract, s. 4;
Maine, Ancient Law, 3d Am. Ed., 332; Ames, Lectures on Legal History, 16o;
judge Swayze, 25 Yale Law Journal, 4.
2. Terry says that there is now no sufficient reason for persisting in the

use of this fiction; and he prefers that non-contractual obligations be frankly
recognized as such. Leading Principles of Anglo-American Law, s. 483; 17

Columbia Law Review, 378.

And in this view, Salmond substantially concurs.

Jurisprudence, Ed., 1902, p. 564.

3. The term Quasi-Contract is unsatisfactory to several jurists. See Sir

F. Pollock, 22 Law Quarterly Review, p. 89; Prof. Corbin, 21 Yale Law Journal,

p. 544 "The name itself has a makeshift air, and is on the face of it a confession
of juristic failure." (From so Law Qu. Rev. 85; in notice of Keener on Quasi
Contract, signed W. R. A., presumably Sir W. R. Anson). "The qualifying
word quasi is too frequently used when one is without an idea and wishes to say
something, or has an idea but does not know how to express it." Prof. Knowlton, 9 Mich. Law Rev. 671.
867See 3o Harv. Law Rev. 409-413.
8 See 3o Harv. Law Review, 413-417; also 33 Harv. Law Rev. 553, 555,
672, 676, 677, 682, 683-684.
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from the general class of torts to that of absolute liability.
And among the cases thus transferred, there will be included
various cases which would formerly have been spoken of as
"torts without particular names."
Cambridge, Mass.

Jeremiah Smith

